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Abstract
Wireless networks are rapidly becoming
ubiquitous but are often insecure and leave users
responsible for their own security. We empirically
study whether users are successfully securing their
client computers when using wireless networks.
Automated techniques are used that scan users’
machines after they associate with a university
wireless network. This determines whether a firewall
is being used and what TCP ports are open. Results
show that over 9% of 3,331 unique computers scanned
were not using a properly configured firewall. In
addition, almost 9% had at least one TCP port open,
with almost 6% having open ports with significant
security implications. We also found and discuss cases
where connected computers were compromised by
Trojan programs such as SubSeven and NetBus. We
discuss the generalizability of our results to other
potentially insecure wireless networks, and
suggestions for further research.

1. Introduction
Analogous to the historic growth of the Internet,
the number of wireless local area networks (hereafter
referred to simply as wireless networks) is exploding
with declining hardware prices and the rapid adoption
of well-accepted standards. Using 802.11a/b/g
standards (also known by the marketing name “WiFi”), access points are increasingly acting as bridges
for users of wireless devices to connect to wired local
area networks and the Internet. Particularly significant
are public access points, commonly known as
hotspots, which are often located in heavily populated
areas such as airports, coffee shops, hotel lobbies, and
public areas, appealing to both business and casual
users but offering little or no security [1].
By January 2006, public hotspots had already
surpassed 100,000 worldwide, up from approximately
57,000 a year before [2]. About 8000 of these are free,
and 92,000 charge for access (although approximately
half of the latter are in hotels and restaurants, many of

which offer access to customers at no added charge).
These public hotspot numbers do not include large
numbers of ostensibly private access points in homes
and businesses or increasing numbers of free hotspots
provided by municipalities and other entities. The
growth in hotspots is expected to continue in part
because they are inexpensive. For example,
maintaining the Bryant Park Wireless Network in New
York City and leasing its T1 backbone connection is
said to cost less than the park spends on trash bags [3].
Additionally, the public in general and business users
in particular are growing accustomed to the mobility
and ubiquitous Internet access these networks provide.
A further impetus to wireless network use is the
increasing proportion of mobile computers. In May of
2004 retail sales of notebook computers surpassed
desktop computer sales for the first time [4]. Even
with threats to data security on the rise, it is estimated
that within the next three years 50% of all workers
will be equipped with a laptop, even though only 10%
of enterprises have a plan in place to manage and
secure these devices [5]. While mobility has benefits
in terms of employee productivity, managing this
mobility and addressing security is an important
requirement. Recommendations include using
software solutions that track devices, enforce security
policy, and synchronize data on the organization’s
terms. The software segment providing mobile
security solutions is expected to grow to $400 million
in sales by 2009, but with a cost of $50-$100 per user
[5]. This added cost is often burdensome for
individuals and organizations with limited budgets.
Computer and network security is consuming an
increasingly larger amount of time, budgets, and other
resources for individuals and organizations. The
spiraling number of viruses and outsider attacks has
driven this attention level, as has the shortened
timeframe between vulnerability announcements and
the appearance of global exploits. Despite this trend,
many wireless networks and particularly public
hotspots have little or no network security enabled. A
recent survey conducted by Panda Software
International determined that approximately 60% of
all wireless networks do not use any form of
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encryption. Of wireless networks with encryption
enabled, approximately 75% are using the wireless
equivalence protocol (WEP), which has several welldocumented security deficiencies [6][7][8]. The
problem is even more acute with public hotspots
because the users of these hotspots are interested in
ease of use and not in the level of security employed
[3]. Guests at hotels, for example, have reported theft
of information from their computers while connected
to the hotel’s wireless network [9]. With the tendency
of wireless users to access the Internet through many
different public access points, the chance of picking up
malicious code is high, and these threats are easily
transferred to wired networks to which those users
may later connect, thus extending the implications of
user security to network security as well.
Given the open nature of public wireless
networks, it is clear that it is the responsibility of the
users of these networks to provide for their own
security [3]. Therefore our study focuses on whether
users of wireless networks are in fact securing their
computers. There is surprisingly little quantifiable
evidence that sheds light on this question, especially
from the perspective of wireless users. For example,
one study [10] examines users’ intention to practice
security (such as employing firewalls), but does not
consider the wireless environment and does not
quantify the subsequent implementation of user
firewalls. Our study specifically explores the issue of
wireless user vulnerabilities and security practices and
quantifies the number of wireless users who are not
achieving an adequate level of security.
Our goal is to directly investigate how well
wireless users are securing their computers. Using a
university campus wireless network, we perform a
vulnerability scan of each wireless user shortly after
they associate to one of the campus access points,
using Nmap to perform the scan [11]. The results of
the Nmap scans are used to determine the proportion
of wireless users not using a firewall and the
proportion of users with open ports. In particular, our
study focuses on open ports with well known security
implications [12] [13] [21] [22]. The specific research
questions addressed are:
1. What is the percentage of wireless network
users not using a firewall?
2. What is the percentage of wireless network
users with detectable open ports?
3. Do open ports tend to be those with significant
security issues?
The following section describes our methodology,
including our subjects, the wireless network studied,
data collection, firewall detection, and port-related
vulnerabilities. Section 3 discusses our empirical
results and relates these results to the research

questions listed above. Finally, section 4 concludes by
summarizing our findings, addressing the study’s
generalizability and limitations, and suggesting future
research topics.

2. Methodology
2.1 Subjects
Subjects for the study are all authorized users of a
campus wireless network. This potentially includes
18,599 students, approximately 1000 faculty and staff,
and a variable number of visitors using the network.
The university is a commuter campus with relatively
non-traditional students and has 15,779 undergraduate
students (average age 26) and 1663 graduate students
(average age 36). The gender percentages are 54%
female and 45% male (1% unspecified). Most students
live off campus, and many have part-time jobs or fulltime careers, often with one of several local high-tech
firms. We view the non-traditional nature of the
student subjects as a positive factor for the study as we
believe it makes them more representative of the
general public and workforce than traditional students
would be.
It is possible that some wireless users on campus
were not included in the study because they did not
connect to an official campus access point, but instead
connected to a “rogue” access point installed by a
student in a dorm room, etc. While campus network
administrators regularly detect and remove these rogue
access points, they continue to come and go. From
what can be observed over time, this is a very small
minority of access points and users.

2.2 The Wireless Network
The wireless network uses approximately 80
Cisco 1200 wireless access points spread throughout a
175-acre campus. Most high-demand areas are
covered, as evidenced by infrequent responses to a
web form inviting users to report areas of missing
coverage or poor signal strength.
Wireless user authentication is done using a webbased challenge-response system interfacing with the
campus LDAP server and using the same single signon directory that authenticates users for the campus
intranet and email systems. Once a user is
authenticated, the MAC address for the network card
installed on the user’s computer is registered with the
wireless network, allowing each authenticated
machine to use the wireless network for a period of
several days before the user is required to reauthenticate. This means that once a user has
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authenticated a computer with the wireless network,
anyone with access to the authenticated machine has
access to the wireless network until the authenticated
period expires.
Wireless traffic on campus is segregated through
the use of separate virtual local area network segments
(VLANs) and IP subnets, and filtered through
firewalls before reaching the campus internal network
or the Internet. The wireless traffic is also managed
through a traffic shaping device. However, other than
the MAC-level access control described in the
previous paragraph, there are no security measures in
place on the wireless network itself. No encryption
(e.g., WEP) is used over the wireless link, and users
desiring additional security must use Virtual Private
Networking (VPN), Secure Shell (SSH), or other
measures not directly provided by the wireless
network. While future plans call for automated
vulnerability assessments that force users to prove that
they have installed required operating system updates
and anti-virus software, these security measures had
not yet been implemented at the time of our study.
We believe that this environment of minimal networklevel security and heavy reliance on user security
makes the campus wireless network reasonably
representative of public hotspot-based wireless
networks in general.

2.3 Data Collection
Data collection was performed continuously
during a 41-day period from April 27 to June 7, 2006.
During that time 3,331 unique, non-university
managed computers connected to the wireless
network. The data collection process consisted of two
main components:
1.
User/client
machine
detection:
A
continuously running script polled the entire set of
access points to retrieve a list of associated user
machines.
2. User vulnerability scans: For each associated
user machine that had not been previously scanned, a
vulnerability scan was performed using Nmap.
User detection was performed with a Perl script
using Net-SNMP [14] and SNMP (Simple Network
Management Protocol) [15]. The script visited each
access point in a continuous loop 24 hours a day,
collecting a list of IP and MAC addresses of
associated computers. After the set of associated
computers is passed to the user vulnerability scan, the
next set is collected. However, before a specific
computer is scanned its MAC address is compared to
the MAC addresses already stored in the database. If
the MAC address is found, the computer is not
scanned. In other words, each computer is scanned

exactly one time, regardless of how often it connected
to the wireless network during the data collection
period. The study was constructed in this manner in
part to minimize any additional load placed on the
wireless network and its users by the study.
Where we were able to identify wireless client
machines as university-owned and maintained devices,
we removed these from the analysis because security
precautions for these computers are largely outside the
control of their users. The number of devices so
identified was 30, which is less that 1% of the total
number of machines studied. It is quite possible that
we were unable to identify every university-owned
machine, but we have reasonable confidence that any
left mis-identified constitute a very small percentage
of the total studied and thus would not significantly
affect our results.
User vulnerability scans were performed using
Nmap [11]. This tool has been used by other
vulnerability analysis researchers, who note that port
scanning has long been used by computer security
analysts and Nmap is an efficient and effective tool for
this purpose [16]. The output of the Nmap scan was
parsed and relevant data was entered into MySQL
database tables. This data was then used to determine
the percentage of wireless network users who: (1) do
not have a firewall; and (2) have open ports that may
have security implications as discussed later.
Nmap was used in verbose and aggressive mode
(nmap –v –A <ip_add>). This enables Nmap to
provide additional information, including information
concerning the service (application) listening to a port.
In addition, we used Nmap’s default port scanning
settings, which is to scan the first 1024 TCP ports as
well as the higher numbered ports listed in Nmap’s
nmap-services database. The nmap-services database
includes contributions from Nmap users world wide
and contains a reasonably complete list of services and
the ports they use. This also enables Nmap to use its
nmap-services-probe database, which contains probes
Nmap can use to verify the identity of a specific
service located at a specific port [17]. This resulted in
a total of 1663 TCP ports being scanned for each
connected computer.

2.4 Firewall Detection
For the TCP ports scanned in this study, Nmap
reports the specific status of ports where a service was
detected. Nmap then reports the status of all the
remaining ports that were scanned but did not have a
service present. The status of each remaining port is
either closed, which means that the port is accessible,
but there is no application listening to the port, or
filtered, which means that Nmap could not determine
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if a port was open because packet filtering was
preventing Nmap’s probes from reaching the port.
This provided the basis for our decision rule to
determine if a specific computer was using a firewall.
If the ports with no detectible application listening
were closed, then the decision was that the computer
was not using a properly configured firewall. If the
ports with no detectible application were filtered, then
the decision was that the computer was using a
properly configured firewall. Note that we use firewall
as a general term for a number of possible filtering
mechanisms that could be present, including both
hardware and software-based firewalls. These decision
rules are summarized in Figure 1 below.
StatusÆ
open
closed
filtered
All Ports
Decision:
Decision:
with no
no
N/A
firewall
detectable
firewall
present
service
present
present
Any port
Decision:
with a
Possible
N/A
N/A
detectable
security
service
vulnerability
present
Figure 1. Port scan interpretations
We validated our firewall detection methods by
scanning
machines
with
known
security
configurations. Using two software-based firewalls
among the most popular with wireless laptop users
(the Windows XP built-in firewall and the third-party
Zone Alarm personal firewall), we turned firewall
features on and off before associating to the wireless
network, followed by scanning the machines to
confirm that the firewall status was properly detected.
In every test case the scanning process and our
decision rules correctly determined the firewall status.

2.5 TCP Port-Related Vulnerabilities
Many user security vulnerabilities are related to
TCP ports either left open inadvertently or deliberately
enabled and used by insecure applications. Any open
port is a potential security issue, and of particular
interest is the set of ports with generally agreed-upon
security implications. The following discussion of port
vulnerabilities relies, to a large extent, on material
provided by Berghel and Hoelzer in [12].
TCP ports 135, 137, 138, and 139 in the Windows
environment are used by the legacy NetBIOS API for
Remote Procedure Call (RPC) communication, while
TCP port 445 is the Server Message Block (SMB)
port. These ports allow file and print sharing in the

windows environment (among other things). They also
allow file and print sharing with Unix/Linux platforms
through SAMBA. All of these ports can allow null
session connections by remote machines, in effect
opening up the computer’s hard disk to external
access.
RPC vulnerabilities also extend to other ports.
With many Internet service providers filtering port
135, ports 1026 through 1029 are being targeted with
Windows Messenger pop-up spam, which is an RPC
service. It is generally suggested that if Windows
Messenger is not needed, ports 1026 through 1029
should be blocked.
Another Windows based vulnerable port related to
NetBIOS is TCP port 42, which is the Windows
Internet Naming Service (WINS). WINS maintains
translation tables from NetBIOS Names to IP
addresses for computers that share resources. It is
possible for hackers to insert a corrupted table into the
system, thereby directing computers to hacker
controlled computers in a manner similar to ARP
poisoning. In the latter case, a false MAC addresses is
inserted into a frame to impersonate trusted network
devices.
The Windows Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP)
port (TCP port 3389) is also of note. This protocol
provides remote access to Windows based computers.
RDP has been shown to be susceptible to denial-ofservice attacks. While this particular vulnerability has
been patched, RDP has been prone to attack for
several years and most security exports suggest that
the port be blocked.
In both the Windows and Unix/Linux
environments, ports 20 and 21 (FTP), port 23 (Telnet),
and port 25 (SMTP) should all be blocked. All of these
ports have well known security issues and are prone to
stack overflow attacks and brute force authentication
and password guessing attempts. In addition, port 22
(SSH) has the same vulnerabilities as the previously
mentioned ports and has the potential for an attacker to
create an encrypted session.
The Rlogin service (port 513) and the finger
service (port 79) should also be blocked. Rlogin is
used for remote access in the Unix/Linux
environment. Most security experts suggest that SSH
be used instead because of its encryption and stronger
authentication. The finger service allows remote
querying of a system for the usernames of individuals
currently logged on. This gives potential hackers half
of the username/password equation.
The LDAP service ports (TCP ports 389, 636,
3268, and 3269) should also be blocked. LDAP is a
directory service used to lookup information such as
usernames, passwords, email addresses, etc. It is
possible, depending on how the information is stored,
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for a hacker to query the LDAP services and recover
information.
A problematic windows service is UPnP
(Universal Plug and Play), which is located on port
5000. This service has been plagued by buffer
overflow and denial of service attacks for several
years. In December 2001 the FBI urged consumers to
disable the UPnP service because the threat was so
significant [13]. Since then, Microsoft has patched
UPnP several times, mitigating the threat. However,
many security experts still consider UPnP to be a
security threat and suggest disabling the service and/or
blocking port 5000 [13].
It is also interesting to note the presence of ports
427 and 548. Port 427 is the port that the slp daemon
listens to on Apple systems. The slp daemon
advertises local services to the network, and is known
to have security issues [21]. Port 548 is the port
afpovertcp listens to. The afpovertcp service
implements the Apple Filing Protocol, which enables
file sharing on an Apple system over TCP
connections. This service has many of the same
security issues that plague the windows file sharing
services and is very dangerous to leave unblocked
[22].

3. Results and Discussion
In general, security experts agree that the most
important step users of wireless networks can take to
protect themselves from other wireless users is to use a
properly configured firewall. This is relatively easy
and inexpensive to do because of firewall software
built into Windows XP [18] or available free from
third parties [19], including open source alternatives
for Linux [20]. To address research question 1, “What
is the percentage of wireless network users not using a
firewall?,” we looked at the status reported by Nmap
for the TCP ports that did not have a detectible service
installed, as described in Figure 1. We found that
9.13% of the 3,331 computers scanned were not using
a properly configured firewall, as shown in Table 1.
Table1. Summary of Results
Research
Question
1. What is
the
percentage
of wireless
network
users not
using a
firewall?

Results
9.13% of the wireless network users
were not using a properly configured
firewall (304 out of 3,331 total users).
90.87% of the wireless network users
were using a properly configured
firewall (3,027 out of 3,331 total users).

2. What is
the
percentage
of wireless
network
users with
detectable
open ports?
3. Do open
ports tend
to be those
with
significant
security
issues?

8.62% of the wireless network users did
have detectable open ports (287 out of
3,331 total users).
91.38% of the wireless network users
did not have detectable open ports
(3,044 out of 3,331 total users).
Of the 287 users with detectable open
ports, 189 (or 65.85%) had at least one
open port with significant security
implications.
Of the 287 users with detectable open
ports, 98 (or 34.15%) had no open ports
with significant security implications.

Even with a firewall, wireless network users can
have detectable open ports. An open port means that
Nmap was able to determine that an application is
accepting TCP packets from that port. Since any open
port is a potential security risk, the second research
question we examined was “What is the percentage of
wireless network users with detectable open ports?.”
In our study, 8.62% of the 3,331 computers scanned
had at least one detectable open port, as shown in
Table 1.
Table 2 shows the frequency of open ports found
in our scans, ordered by decreasing frequency. As
discussed in the previous section, some ports are more
dangerous than others to leave open. This leads to the
third research question “Do open ports tend to be
those with significant security issues?.” Table 2
shows, in the second column, ports having a notable
security issue. Shaded rows indicate a port with
notable security issues and where we found at least
one client with that port open. We found that 5.67% of
the wireless users had at least one of these dangerous
ports open and accepting TCP packets (see Table 1).
See section 2.5 above for a discussion of each port’s
significance.
Table 2. Results from Nmap port scans
Notable
TCP Port
Common
Percent
Security
Number(s)
Services
Open
Issue
Microsoft File
and Print
139
Yes
4.0%
Sharing; Unix
SAMBA
Microsoft RPC
135
Yes
3.3%
Server
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445

Yes

3689
427
1025

Yes

548

Yes

5000

Yes

80

Yes

1761
22

Yes

3389

Yes

21
25

Yes
Yes

1026

Yes

389
1027, 1028,
1029
20
23
42
79

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

137

Yes

138

Yes

513
636
3268
3269
8080

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

Microsoft File
and Print
Sharing; Unix
SAMBA
Rendezvous
(Apple iTunes)
Apple slpd
msrpc
Apple
afpovertcp
Universal Plug
and Play
HTTP Web
Server
landesk-rc
Secure Shell
Windows
Remote
Desktop
Protocol (RDP)
FTP
SMTP
Microsoft RPC
Server
LDAP Service
Microsoft RPC
Server
FTP
Telnet
WINS Server
Finger Server
Microsoft File
and Print
Sharing; Unix
SAMBA
Microsoft File
and Print
Sharing; Unix
SAMBA
Rlogin
LDAP Service
LDAP Service
LDAP Service
HTTP Proxy

3.3%

2.2%

number relative to the total number of wireless users,
the existence of malware is an important finding
because such infected machines may be used to launch
attacks against the much larger client population. A
complete list of the malware found and the number of
infected computers detected is presented in Table 3.

1.6%
1.3%
1.1%

Table 3. Malware found
Name

0.8%
0.8%
0.7%
0.5%

NetBus

0.4%
qaz
0.4%
0.1%

Kuang2

0.1%
0.06%
0%
0%
0%
0%
0%
0%

Back Orifice
2000 (bo2k)

Elite on port
31337

0%
0%
0%
0%
0%
0%

As can be seen in Table 2, the most frequently
open ports are also some of the most dangerous. The
top three open ports (in order 139, 445, and 135) are
all dangerous and were discussed in section 2.5.
We also noticed the presence on the wireless
network of several computers that were infected with
various malware applications. A total of 17 computers
(0.5% of the computers scanned) had at least one
malware application installed. Although a small

Trinoo
Master

SubSeven

Description
Very similar to Back
Orifice. Allows for a
computer to be
controlled remotely
without a client (from
IRC). Online keystroke
logging
A worm application that
provides a backdoor into
a system.
Provides a backdoor into
a system. Also captures
passwords.
Allows for a computer
to be controlled
remotely without a
client (from IRC).
Online keystroke
logging.
Nmap uses Elite for
anything it finds running
on port 31337, which is
a well known Trojan
port. Most likely Trojan
is Back Orifice
Server application used
to simultaneously
control many
compromised
computers. Most often
used to begin and
manage denial of service
attacks.
Allows for a computer
to be controlled
remotely without a
client (from IRC).
Online keystroke
logging.

Number
of Users
Infected

9

6

5

4

4

2

2

A more detailed description of each malware
application can be found at [23]. Note that many of the
infected computers had multiple malware applications
present. Of particular interest (and somewhat
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alarming) is the presence on many of the compromised
computers of network monitoring and packet sniffing
applications. Of the 17 infected computers, 12 also
had at least one network monitoring/packet sniffing
application. The most common network monitoring
tools found were nessus, bigbrother, and netsaint.

4. Conclusions
4.1 Summary of findings
Our results indicate that a small but significant
number of wireless network users are not using a
firewall (9.13%) and/or have detectable open ports
(8.62%), some of which have important security
implications. The study also found that the ports most
often left open were also the ports with the most
serious security implications (see Table 1). When a
machine had any ports open, there was a greater than
65% chance that one or more of those ports had
significant security implications.
Of additional note are the 17 computers that have
been compromised by various forms of malware. Also
disturbing was the presence on these compromised
machines of network monitoring tools such as nessus.
This opens up the possibility of these infected
computers not only being used to infect other
unprotected computers on the network, but to also act
as packet sniffers and to launch other forms of attack
such as ARP poisoning and man-in-the-middle attacks.
Wireless users are particularly vulnerable to man-inthe-middle attacks in which a hacker, using a
computer, emulates a rogue access point with the
specific intent of capturing log-in credentials.

4.2 Generalizability
The campus wireless network we studied shares
many similarities with public hotspots—both free and
fee-based. The network employs no form of security
other than simple authentication and subsequent
MAC-level access control. There were no enforced
policies requiring users to employ security measures
such as firewalls. Therefore, this study provides
insight into the behavior of open wireless network
users concerning their security precautions.
The campus user population is reasonably similar
to the general public because of the large number of
part-time and non-traditional students. These users
connect to the wireless network with a variety of
personal and employer-owned laptop computers, and
perform a variety of tasks including personal, schoolrelated, and work-related activities. If anything,
because of security awareness and guidance provided

by the university and their employers, they may be
somewhat more security conscious than the general
public, possibly understating the average wireless
network user’s vulnerability.
The methods we used may be replicated in a
number of different wireless environments. As long as
wireless access points support the SNMP protocol (as
do most) and can be queried for information about
associated users, user/client machine detection is
feasible. Similarly, our user vulnerability scans rely
only on the ability to probe client machines by IP
address—a capability that should be available on any
network with appropriate security permissions. Thus
the same basic methodology can be applied to study
additional wireless networks, whether they be open or
closed, public or private. Our methodology also
provides a reasonably general method for conducting
wireless security audits.

4.3 Limitations
Although we scanned every client computer that
accessed the campus wireless network during a 41-day
period, there might be a small number of users
undetected by this process. The majority of these are
expected to be users who deliberately or inadvertently
associated with ephemeral and unauthorized rogue
access points. We estimate this number to be a very
small percentage of the total users.
The vulnerability analysis we conducted is
heavily dependent on TCP port scans. There are a
lesser number of vulnerabilities associated with UDP
ports, such as SNMP port 161, which we did not test.
We also did not probe deeper than the port response
level—e.g., if port 80 responded we did not then issue
HTTP requests to that port to determine whether
application-level authentication was in place that
could provide some protection to the user. Of course,
there are a host of other security-related issues that
affect users and are outside the scope of this research,
including privacy/anonymity, viruses, and spyware.

4.4 Future research
This study quantified a small but significant
number of wireless network users not properly
protecting themselves by using a properly configured
firewall. It similarly identified a number of important
vulnerabilities at the TCP port level that significantly
compromises user security. Additional research is
needed in other public and private wireless networks
to confirm the broader applicability of these findings.
The present study addresses only one element in a
larger constellation of wireless user security awareness
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and behavior questions, i.e., user security measures
actually implemented at one point in time. Several
other questions concerning knowledge, beliefs, and
education/training effects need to be studied.
Examples of specific questions include:
1. How knowledgeable are users about the
specific vulnerabilities that exist on their computers?
2. How important do users believe firewalls and
other security measures are to them personally?
3. If users are educated about wireless network
vulnerabilities and offered training in how to mitigate
them, how will their behaviors change over time?
Further research in this stream will investigate
questions such as those above, as well as study
emerging wireless networking threats.
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